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Abstract
Intermediation in markets is a phenomenon that has been studied by many researchers
from a variety of different theoretical angles. With the introduction and diffusion of the
Internet in everyday life, broad predictions were made that called for disintermediation
enabled by direct Internet linkages between suppliers and buyers and lower transaction
costs. The often-cited paper by Sarkar, Butler and Steinfield (1995) challenges this
prediction. By comparing Internet effects on transaction costs with the cost situation ex
ante, the paper explains that both direct sales or cybermediated sales are possible
outcomes. In this paper we confront key assumptions of the Sarkar et al. paper with
recent developments in the tourism market. We find that in the tourism market a
multitude of direct and indirect distribution channels exist next to each other. Multilevel distribution channels often including several cybermediaries have been built,
resulting in a complex market topology. We also see a large variety of intermediary
roles, resulting from highly specialized and highly integrated cybermediary business
models. Furthermore the model of Sarkar et al. fails to deliver an explanation for the
on-going dynamics in the tourism market in terms of shifts towards more or less
intermediaries and the emergence of new intermediary-like business models. By taking
these trends into account we are able to identify relevant future research directions in
order to extend our understanding of the phenomenon of electronic intermediaries in
markets.
Keywords: Cybermediaries, Intermediation, Electronic Intermediaries, Electronic
Markets, Disintermediation Hypothesis, Tourism Industry
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1 Introduction
The terms „cybermediary‟, „electronic intermediary‟, „electronic intermediation‟ and
„disintermediation‟ are widespread and frequently used in the field of e-business
research (Dai & Kauffman, 2002; Fielt, 2006; Giaglis, Klein, & O'Keefe, 2002; Novak
& Schwabe, 2009; Rensmann & Smits, 2008; Rossignoli, Carugati, & Mola, 2009).
Especially the term „cybermediary‟ has become quite popular since its introduction by
Mitra Barun Sarkar, Brian Butler and Charles Steinfield in their influential (566
citations according to Google Scholar) 1995 paper on the continuing roles of mediating
players in electronic marketplaces (Sarkar, Butler, & Steinfield, 1995). The paper is a
response and indeed rebuttal to the so called “disintermediation hypothesis”, a broad
prediction that was made since the end of the 1980s by several researchers and that
forecasted the disappearance of intermediaries due to lower transaction costs when two
market participants interact directly over the Internet. Sarkar et al. (1995) in their
response argue that in contrast to these claims for disintermediation, intermediaries still
play a role in electronic marketplaces and might, under certain circumstances, become
even more important than their non-electronic counterparts. To prove their claim, they
use a dyadic transaction model that depicts a transaction between a buyer and a seller in
comparison with a transaction between a seller and an intermediary and between an
intermediary and a buyer respectively. However, their model makes simplifying
assumptions about environmental factors and behavioral patterns of market participants.
This limits the explanatory scope of the model.
Therefore the goal of this paper is twofold: First of all we want to recapitulate Sarkar et
al.‟s arguments and try to identify key assumptions in their line of reasoning. We
illustrate our points by examples from the tourism industry, which exhibits multiple
facets of intermediation. Thus the tourism industry provides a rich environment to study
the phenomenon of intermediation in electronic marketplaces. Moreover, we have
reviewed the existing body of literature on intermediation. By following this approach
we deliberately increase the level of model complexity in order to achieve a more
differentiated understanding of the phenomenon of IT-enabled intermediation. This
leads us to the second contribution of this paper, the identification of future research
directions addressing interesting and little explored aspects of electronic intermediation.
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we will recapitulate the paper of Sarkar
et al. (1995). In section 3 we extend the model by contrasting central assumptions with
examples from the tourism industry and recent research. Section 4 discusses the
findings and makes future research suggestions. Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 Sarkar, Butler & Steinfield, (1995)
The paper of Sarkar et al. (1995) addresses the “disintermediation hypothesis”, which
forecasted the disappearance of intermediaries in markets due to the advent of
ubiquitously available electronic networks where buyers and sellers meet and transact
directly1. Advocates of the disintermediation hypothesis have used a transaction cost
rationale, stating that market transactions via the Internet are cheaper in terms of
1 Sarkar et al. (1995) use the term „National Information Infrastructure“ (NII) and compare the traditional
situation (without the possibilities of the NII) with the situation where market participants can make use
of the possibilities of the NII after its introduction. We set the term NII synonymous to „Internet‟ and use
the latter term throughout this article.
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transaction costs than on traditional, offline markets. Malone, Yates and Benjamin, in
their seminal 1987 article, predicted a general move to the market because IT reduces
transaction costs and enables market participants to conduct transactions on electronic
markets at comparatively lower cost than on traditional markets. Along with this,
brokers would become dispensable, because electronic markets can fulfill many of the
same functions like traditional brokers in connecting buyers and sellers. Malone et al.
(1987) called this the “electronic brokerage effect” (Malone, Yates, & Benjamin, 1987).
Benjamin and Wigand (1995) described how the information infrastructure might affect
value chains and redistribute profits along them. They show with an example how the
price of a shirt could drop by more than 60 % if wholesalers and retailers would be cut
out of the value chain (Benjamin & Wigand, 1995).
Sarkar et al. (1995) modify and extend Benjamin and Wigand‟s disintermediation
argument. Two key assumptions are identified that formed the basis of prevalent
analyses about threatened intermediaries. The first key assumption says that, with a
ubiquitous information infrastructure in place, transaction costs are zero (insignificant)
while the second key assumptions states that all transactions are atomic, i.e. not
dividable into smaller units. Both assumptions have been recognized as problematic.
Regarding the first assumption they state that it is very unlikely that all transaction costs
are reduced to zero, but instead still incur non-negligible costs that are different for
different classes of transactions.
Sarkar et al. (1995) apply a transaction cost-based rationale to prove in a semi-formal
way that disintermediation is only one of four possible effects of an ubiquitous
information infrastructure (see Figure 1). The model delineates dyadic transactions
taking place between a producer of an unspecified product, a consumer and an
intermediary. They show that there are four possible outcomes regarding intermediation,
as illustrated in Figure 2 and briefly discussed hereafter (Sarkar, Butler, & Steinfield,
1995).

Figure 1: Model showing dyadic transactions between a producer, a consumer and an
intermediary. Based on (Sarkar, Butler & Steinfield, 1995).

Scenario 1 in Figure 2 shows the possibility of a direct producer-consumer market that
is reinforced by the possibilities of the Internet. Sector 2 depicts the scenario of
disintermediation. Sector 3 represents a new breed of intermediaries that Sarkar et al.
(1995) called “cybermediaries”. These IT-enabled intermediaries provide transactionsupporting services that enable market transactions at a lower cost then via a direct
transaction between producer and consumer, even though such a transaction might have
been cheaper before the possibilities of the Internet became available. Sector 4 describes
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reinforced traditional intermediaries that use the possibilities of the Internet to
supplement their existing market position.

Figure 2: The four outcomes regarding intermediation in markets that result from a comparison
of transaction costs before and after the advent of the Internet. Based on: (Sarkar, Butler &
Steinfield, 1995).

Regarding the second key assumption of the disintermediation hypothesis, Sarkar et al.
(1995) argue that transactions are not atomic and indivisible, but rather consist of
different parts, which should be regarded in more detail. In order to support their
argument they provide a differentiated list of cybermediaries‟ functions and transactionsupporting services.

3 Extending the Model of Sarkar et al. (1995)
Sarkar et al.‟s (1995) paper was obviously not intended as an exhaustive analysis of the
phenomenon of intermediation in electronic markets. The authors particularly point out
that they use a simple model in order to prove their argument (Sarkar, Butler, &
Steinfield, 1995). What the model fails to explain is, however, to what degree the
predicted shifts are supposed to happen and what contextual circumstances lead to what
outcome, or whether one outcome will dominate under certain circumstances.
Furthermore it does not become clear how exactly the roles played by intermediaries or
cybermediaries influence the relative cost advantages of the different outcomes, with
implications to how an intermediary business model should look like that realizes these
advantages or how a supplier should design a multi-channel distribution strategy.
The tourism industry knows many different kinds of intermediaries and provides plenty
of evidence of dis-, re- and cyber-mediation. In the remainder of this chapter we will
use evidence from the tourism industry for a critical examination of their model, in
order to illustrate some of the above mentioned points.. We will also point to published
research on intermediaries and intermediation. The following discussion focuses on
three different aspects: Market topology, types and roles of intermediation in the market
and market dynamics.
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3.1 Market Topology
Sarkar et al. (1995) compare the transaction costs of a direct producer-consumer
exchange with an intermediated exchange consisting of a transaction between supplier
and intermediary and between intermediary and consumer. This simplistic view neglects
the topology and nature of a market. The model depicts one intermediary, one supplier
and one consumer. However, this is only an exceptional and rare case, because
intermediaries typically provide a link between multiple suppliers and multiple
consumers. Often there are also several intermediaries involved in fulfilling a
customer‟s need. This results in a n:m:o topology. Werthner and Klein depict the
tourism market as having a network-like topology, with the consumers (tourists) on one
side and the suppliers (primary suppliers, e.g. airlines and hotels) on the other side
(Werthner & Klein, 1999). The network in between consists of different classes of
players with varying types of relationships: “The specific characteristic of travel and
tourism is that on the supply side the industry acts as a network where different
suppliers as well as intermediaries cooperate in order to offer the final product and to
service the consumer” (Werthner & Klein, 1999).
For the sake of clarification we assume a one tier distribution system for now, involving
retail intermediaries and a variety of different suppliers and customers with different
preferences. A good example is the market for flight tickets with many different airlines
as suppliers, travel agents or online travel portals as intermediaries and travelers being
customers with different profiles (leisure vs. business travelers, luxury-oriented vs.
budget-oriented travelers). In the following we describe different aspects that result
from this extended topological view for suppliers, intermediaries and customers:




Suppliers: The structure of the market influences the channel choice of a
supplier (direct vs. intermediated). In a market like the airline ticket market, with
a lot of competition and many intermediaries in the value chain, choosing the
right channel strategy is crucial for the airlines. Many no-frills airlines like
Ryanair or Easyjet choose to exclusively sell their tickets directly on their own
company websites. Marketing channels might also be combined, using various
intermediaries as well as direct selling in order to optimally reach customers
with different preferences. The power of big online travel portals should not be
neglected, as they provide search economies for customers and it is important
for an airline to get a good position in the search results. Furthermore suppliers
need to understand customers‟ needs and preferences, which often include the
need for combining several suppliers in travel packages (flight + hotel + rental
car) and a wide range of offers to choose from.
Intermediaries: Intermediaries address customer needs as well supplier needs.
For customers they provide, amongst others, comparison shopping, independent
advice and assurance. An example is Travelocity, a travel portal that acts as a
cybermediary connecting consumers with many different suppliers (flights,
hotels, rental car etc.) (Inkpen, 1998). Supplier needs include market access,
distribution efficiencies and the proper addressing of customer needs. Online
travel portals like Travelocity fulfill these tasks, however, at a certain cost.
Additionally intermediaries on the same level of the distribution chain compete
against each other for suppliers and customers.
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Customers: As indicated above, consumer needs in the tourism sector are
usually fulfilled by a conglomerate of services provided by a variety of suppliers
and intermediaries, some of which are complementary and dependent upon each
other. I.e., there is a difference for a consumer when choosing between different
suppliers for one and the same product (e.g. flight) or between different
suppliers for different products (e.g. flight, hotel, rental car). The difference in
complexity and search cost might influence the choice between an intermediated
purchase via a travel platform, which integrates the different suppliers for a
vacation, and direct interactions with the suppliers. Other factors that influence
this choice are market structure and competencies of the customer. If the market
is highly fragmented on the supply side, customers might prefer an intermediary,
e.g. if travelers are looking for hostels or small hotels, which exist in a lot of
different sizes and forms in big cities. In contrast, when booking a flight on a
well-served route (e.g. Frankfurt – London), budget-oriented travelers might first
look for rates at the websites of no-frills airlines. Older or less experienced
travelers might not have the competencies or motivation to book their trip online
and prefer the traditional brick-and-mortar travel agent with personal advice.

As we include these considerations into the transaction model of Sarkar et al. (1995), a
more complicated model results. Figure 3 shows a market topology that includes
multiple intermediaries, multiple customers (segments) and multiple suppliers for every
service. Services (flight, hotel room, rental car) from different suppliers (airlines, hotels
and car rentals) are necessary to fulfill a customer‟s need (e.g. a holiday trip). Different
intermediaries are competing against each other, so the customer has to choose one or
many to book his holidays. If the traveler is booking directly, she has to conduct three
distinct transactions (T1a, T1b and T1c). Suppliers have to take a lot more options into
account when designing their multi-channel strategy. Different customer segments can
be reached either directly, or via a multitude of intermediated channels, raising
questions about customer relationship management.

Figure 3: Extended model taking into account a more complex market topology.

The nature of the linkage between intermediaries and supplier and buyers is another
point neglected in the model of Sarkar et al. (1995). Some intermediaries are suppliers‟
agents, some are customers‟ agents and others are neutral market agents. (Klein &
Teubner, 2000). E.g. Sabre is an intermediary that initially connected travel agents with
426

Sarkar, Butler & Steinfield (1995) “Intermediaries and Cybermediaries” Revisited
primary suppliers (small hotels, providers of cultural and entertainment activities etc.).
Sabre was founded by American Airlines (suppliers‟ agent) and initially gave
preference to American Airlines‟ flights (Hopper, 1990; Riemer & Lehrke, 2009). The
travel guide platform Lonely Planet acts as a buyers‟ agent by providing
recommendations and evaluations of tourism products and destinations to travelers2.

3.2 Types and Roles of Intermediation in the Market
As indicated in the previous section, intermediaries play several roles in markets like
product search, bundling, provision of market access and many more. It is important to
note that the variety of roles that intermediaries play result from the complexity of
different market topologies. On the other hand, relationships between intermediaries are
subject to specific governance structures like cooperations. Thus additional criteria are
needed to analyze the roles and added value (for the different market participants) of
those intermediary constellations.
Choudhury and Konsynski (1998) analyze intermediaries in terms of transaction cost
efficiencies and identify two different kinds of scale economies that intermediaries offer
to buyers: search economies and exchange economies. A buyer can profit from search
economies if her product mix uncertainty is high, which means that the buyer purchases
a different product in each transaction and is uncertain of what product to purchase in
the next transaction. Market variability leads to high search costs either if a market is
highly fragmented or is highly volatile. An intermediary in a market realizes exchange
economies by bundling different products from a variety of suppliers in one single
transaction, thereby reducing the costs of the necessary information exchanges
(Choudhury & Konsynski, 1998). This distinction between search and exchange
economies provides a classification approach for classifying common services
intermediaries are offering. Table 1 gives a non-exhaustive overview of services and
examples from the tourism sector addressing search and exchange economies.

2 http://www.lonelyplanet.com/.
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Roles

Example

Search

Travelocity and Expedia are online travel supermarkets that enable

Search economies

search across a range of tourism products (flights, hotels, rental cars).
Evaluations and

By evaluating hotels and providing reviews about travel destinations,

ratings

Travelocity and Expedia help customers finding the optimal balance
between price and quality

Needs assessment

Lonely Planet is a travel portal for young, independent and budgetaware travelers. It gathers a lot of information and travel
recommendations about worldwide destinations on its web portal and
helps customers to find a travel destination that matches their own travel
style (all-inclusive, independent traveling, luxury, etc.).

economies

Exchange

Bundling

Travelocity and Expedia bundle tourism products for customers, so that
these can book their vacation on one single website.

Product

Online travel supermarket makes suggestions for product configurations,

configuration

e.g. suggest a hotel near the airport of arrival when booking a flight

recommendations

Table 1: Overview of common intermediary roles in the tourism market addressing search and
exchange economies

The variety of different roles and the complex topology of the tourism market raise the
question of the significance for the market participants. Booking platforms like hotel.de
or hotels.com enable the booking of hotel rooms and act as transaction processors
between the suppliers (hotels) and the customers. In contrast, a travel portal like
tripadvisor.com only bundles price information about hotel rooms, but does not mediate
the real booking. The business model of these providers is not based on raising a fee for
handling the actual transaction, but on click-through commissions they receive from the
booking platforms they refer to. A further difference needs to be made between service
complementors and intermediaries. If a customer books a flight via a travel agent, it is
usually only of little importance to him which player maintains the airport facilities,
provides in-flight meals or the shuttle to the airport. These services complement the core
product (i.e., the flight), however, if something goes wrong the customer might as well
blame the travel agent (although the travel agent is not responsible). This illustrates the
role an intermediary plays for the customer even beyond a certain market transaction.
There is a trend on the tourism market towards highly integrated platforms like online
supermarkets on the one hand and highly specialized services in terms of service scope
and customer segmentation on the other hand. Examples for the latter are the search
engine qfly.com for discount airlines and luxurytravel.com for extravagant journeys.
This leads to complex architectures of service and intermediary configurations and
makes it difficult to compare intermediary types and roles. Comparison is especially
difficult if services are provided in multiple steps, involving several intermediaries or
service providers and if different business models are combined in order to integrate
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additional services for customers. Airlines e.g. become intermediaries themselves by
offering third party services complementing their own core product (the flight).
Examples here are no-frills carriers like Ryanair or Easyjet, offering hotels, rental cars
and insurances to their customers in the course of their booking process. This
development can be characterized as an extension of the direct sales models, as shown
in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Airlines offer complementing services by third parties to their customers and thus
fulfill an intermediating role.

Highly integrated and specialized business models lead to different transaction
characteristics and multiple relationships between the players. While Sarkar et al.
(1995) point to the fact that transactions are not atomic and that the single parts of the
transaction can be supported by different cybermediary services, we find that actors
carry out different kinds of transactions in the context of compound tourism services
like a holiday trip. Complementing services can most often be booked separately.
Airlines e.g. use upselling techniques which enable customers to upgrade their travel
class, use priority boarding or be allowed to take extra luggage. Intermediaries, by
selling complementing services like insurances or phone cards, also conduct different
kinds of transactions. Figure 5 shows the resulting extended model.

Figure 5: Extension of the Sarkar et al. (1995)-model with multiple transactional relationships,
depicting different characters of transactions
429
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3.3 Market Dynamics and Competition
The continuously changing intermediation structure in a market such as the tourism
market is highly contingent on industry characteristics and the competitive market
environment. Sarkar et al. (1995) implicitly assume some kind of dynamism by saying
that there are four different outcomes possible with the Internet in place. However, they
do not explain whether or not transitions are possible between the different scenarios in
Figure 2, and if yes, what kind of transitions might occur under what circumstances. An
interesting question would e.g. be, how threatened intermediaries can make use of the
possibilities of the Internet in order to strengthen their market position (and thus move
to sector 4). The lack of evolutionary aspects in previous work on disintermediation and
its short-term character were also mentioned by other researchers. Chircu and Kauffman
(2000) elaborate on these aspects in their “intermediation, disintermediation, and
reintermediation-” (IDR-) framework (Chircu & Kauffman, 2000). They identify three
distinct phases: The intermediation phase, the disintermediation phase and the
reintermediation phase. These three phases occur, according to Chircu and Kauffman,
in cycles and repeatedly with every e-commerce innovation that is introduced in a
market. Intermediation means the entry of a new, IT-enabled e-commerce player
(cybermediary) in a market, leading to the disintermediation of established players.
Reintermediation occurs when an established player regains ground by the likewise
utilization of e-commerce technologies, complementing its traditional business model
(Chircu & Kauffman, 2000). When observing the rapid changes in the tourism industry
that occurred over the last two decades it becomes difficult though to identify cycles or
regularly recurring patterns of intermediation, disintermediation and reintermediation in
this industry. Instead, different moves of different players that lead to inter-, dis-, re- or
cybermediation of certain players happen at the same time and contribute to a
continuously changing market picture.
Since the advent of cybermediaries like Travelocity or Expedia, the main street travel
agent from around the corner became a threatened species. The declining number of
traditional travel agents is a fact in many countries3. Many customers now configure
their trips online. Cybermediaries like Expedia and other online travel supermarkets
enable customers to build their own trip from a wide range of options, combining
flights, hotels and rental cars according to their own itinerary4. Nevertheless, not only
since the rise of no-frills airlines like Ryanair that sell tickets exclusively via their own
website, airlines are trying to sell tickets directly to customers, using their own website
as distribution channel, thereby bypassing cybermediaries (Inkpen, 1998). In response
to intense price competition, United Airlines has even offered a best price guarantee on
its Web site clearly aimed at establishing their direct sales as their primary distribution
channel5. Another illustrative example is American Airlines, which has not renewed
contracts with two intermediaries (Orbitz, Opodo) because it claims that the
intermediaries do not properly endorse their new pricing model6. This phenomenon
3 In Germany, the number of travel agencies is declining since many years, see:
http://www.drv.de/index.php?id=548&no_cache=1&sword_list[0]=travel&sword_list[1]=agents.
4 See http://www.expedia.com/daily/packages/default.asp?rfrr=-856790#featPkg.
5 See
http://www.united.com/page/article/0,6722,51216,00.html?navSource=hp_benefits_features&linkTitle=lf
g.
6 See http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/business/05air.html?_r=2&hpw.
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could also be called “dis-cybermediation”, which means that the cybermediaries, once
seen as disintermediation threat, become threatened themselves.
Because airlines can offer consumers privileged access to their own products by running
promotions, offering better seat assignment, cancellation policies, upgrades and frequent
traveller awards, which are not available for travel intermediaries, their behaviour has
been criticised as “predatory disintermediation”. Predatory disintermediation aims at
intensifying the competition in the industry and cutting out intermediaries by adapting
the airlines‟ own distribution channel in a way that makes it impossible for
intermediaries to compete with it (Berghel, 2000).
However, as more and more airlines establish their own, direct distribution channel,
customers are faced with increasing complexity and search costs, making a complete
disintermediation of cybermediaries and travel agents unlikely. On the contrary:
Traditional travel agents apparently still play an important role in fulfilling customer‟s
individual travel needs and there are plenty of examples of successful reintermediation.
Many traditional travel agents now maintain their own websites with travel information
and booking possibilities in addition to their existing network of stores7. Another
phenomenon which was described by Chircu and Kauffman (2000) can also be observed
in the tourism industry: The new intermediaries make their technologies and platforms
available to other players in the market and thus turn into technology providers (Chircu
& Kauffman, 2000). E.g. Sabre was founded as computer reservation system by
American Airlines, offering flight reservation services to travel agencies. Nowadays
Sabre is a versatile service provider serving travel agencies, corporations, governance
agencies and suppliers8. Sabre also owns Travelocity, one of the large online travel
supermarkets, which competes with the travel agencies.
The ongoing movements of the different players - intermediaries and tourism principals
- reflect the intensity of competition in the fragmented and volatile tourism market.
Intermediaries try to gain an advantage by negotiating exclusive deals with tourism
principals. Hotel.de, for example, offers “best deals” with certain hotels or little extras,
like a bottle of water, for customers that book their stay on hotel.de9. On an alternative
hotel-platform, hrs.com, customers might get cheaper stays for various hotels, as
hrs.com is promoting their “exclusive price”, guaranteeing a price which is 10 % lower
than with any other travel platform10.
These various examples illustrate the dynamic nature of the tourism market in terms of
intermediaries with innovative business models entering the market, intermediaries
exiting the market and the various competitive moves the players are engaged in in
order to gain ground and reach the customer.

4 Discussion
The tourism industry is an example of a highly fragmented industry with multiple
players at each level of the distribution chain. We find a co-existence of intermediation,
7 See e.g. American Express (http://www.americanexpress.com) and STA Travel
(http://www.statravel.com/).
8 See http://www.sabretravelnetwork.com/home/products_services/product_index/.
9 See http://www.hotel.info/homepage.aspx?lng=EN
10 See http://www.hrs.com
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disintermediation and an increasing number of cybermediation with a broad and
differentiated range of value propositions and roles. This complexity creates the
necessity to thoroughly distinguish between the different roles and perspectives of the
market participants in order to analyze the benefits and drawbacks of intermediaries and
the overall intermediation structure. Taking the perspective of a supplier, e.g. an airline,
the question of selling directly to consumers or using an intermediated channel is one of
choosing the right multi-channel-strategy. Most airlines pursue a multi-channel-strategy
by using direct as well as intermediated sales via multiple intermediaries, with some
even creating their own new intermediary channel (e.g. Orbitz.com or Opodo.com). On
the other hand, we showed that many airlines are trying to strengthen their direct sales
channel by using “predatory” means and sometimes even compete against their own
intermediary spin-offs. From a customer‟s point of view the question of buying directly
from the supplier or using an intermediary is likely to be related to the complexity and
the size of the search space relative to their own expertise and risk preference. When the
choice of the airline is obvious due to the offered route (and price), customers are likely
to go the direct way. Whenever customers want a comparison across different airlines
(and alliances), cybermediaries can help to reduce search (i.e. comparison) costs.
Experimental research might be a way to study consumer‟s behavior in choosing an
intermediary or going directly to the supplier.
From an intermediary‟s point of view, in order to survive and thrive, it is not only
important to be aware of the existing supply and match this to customer‟s wishes (i.e., to
have a good business model), but also to watch out for disintermediation threats coming
from unexpected sides. Predatory disintermediation makes it very difficult for travel
portals offering typical tourism services like flight and hotel booking to respond
properly, as they simply cannot get access to the conditions the tourism suppliers are
offering their clients directly. They need to find the right strategy to cope with this,
which might be the introduction of better search services among many different
suppliers or including travelers to improve services through e.g. customers‟ reviews and
recommendations. With some extreme examples of predatory disintermediation it might
even be worth to check the matter with the anti-trust authorities. Another reason for the
disintermediation of single intermediaries is competition amongst intermediaries. There
is an intense competition between different intermediaries who offer travel agency
functions online (online travel platforms) and those with specific business models, such
as Priceline, which is offering a patented name-your-own-price model, or Tripadvisor,
which is a platform particularly for customer generated travel information but also links
to online travel agencies for quotes.
The channel structure in the tourism sector is changing rapidly and continuously due to
the intense competition between the many different players in the industry. This forces
the competitors – supplier and intermediaries alike – to constantly be aware of new
technological and product-related innovations and to react quickly in case the own
market position is at stake. It might be dangerous for suppliers or intermediaries to
depend too much on the consumer, as opportunism and cherry-picking from a large
range of offerings makes consumer behaviour rather unpredictable. Also with new
developments like Web 2.0 and social networking at hand, consumers trust fellow
travellers‟ recommendations more than those of suppliers and intermediaries. In order to
be able to analyze these issues, other viewpoints than the widely and often exclusively
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used transaction cost theory should be taken to explain aspects of intermediation in
markets, as suggested by Jin and Robey (1999). They e.g. propose the use of consumer
choice theory (CCT) for analyzing the economic benefits of intermediaries. CCT states
that consumers are producing final desires instead of just purchasing single goods or
products. A vacation with the goal of relaxing can be such a final desire. However, the
fulfillment of this final desire depends on a variety of complementing products and
services that the consumer needs to purchase (e.g. flight, hotel, rental car, activities), the
time and energy the individual spends for its “production”, i.e. combination of the
booked products (planning activities, preparing for the trip etc.) and the ability to do so
(e.g. with the support of travel-guide portals like Lonely Planet). Jin and Robey also
suggest other theories for analyzing intermediation like social network theories,
knowledge broker theory and institutional theory (Jin & Robey, 1999).
In sum, the tourism industry has become a complex ecosystem of co-existing and
competing models of intermediated and direct distribution. The level of competition
reflects the number of relevant players at the respective stages of the value chain as well
as upstream competition. Many of the outcomes can be explained (ex post) by using a
transaction cost rationale, however, relative cost advantages for the respective players
and transaction attributes (frequency, information asymmetry, uncertainty) need to be
taken into account. Also previous work mainly focused on dyadic relationships and
decisions of single players towards or against using an intermediary or on the business
models of single intermediaries. Moreover, we found an enduring role of specific
contingencies (operated routes, price policy, patented business models, …), which
reflect strategic choices of the economic actors.
What is needed are ways that enable a better analysis of the factors that drive or hinder
intermediation in markets. In addition approaches to conduct a strategic analysis of the
relevant market power of actors and the dependencies between them are needed. The
American Airlines case (see chapter 3.3) illustrates the relevance of this problem.
Another problem is the complexity of intermediation and distribution structures which
is closely related to issues of specialization, innovation and division of work. One way
to manage this complexity might be through the use of typologies or configurations. The
idea of configuration analysis is to identify a manageable number of archetypes or
generic constellations – configurations - which describe a wide variety of existing actor
constellations. Thereby these configurations take actors‟ strategies, the structure of the
actor constellations and the environment into account (Miller, 1986). The goal of
typologies is the identification of ideal types on the basis of different dimensions. The
ideal types can be used as a standard of comparison for real world examples to compare
them with and see how well they approximate them. A typology, if thoroughly
identified and defined, is a theory in itself, which can be used to explain observed
phenomena (Doty & Glick, 1994). Mintzberg‟s five organizational patterns are a well
known example (Mintzberg, 1983). Analyzing intermediation at the level of
configurations or ideal types would differ from the approach of analyzing decisions of
single players in dyadic relationships (towards or against using an intermediary), which
is the common stance taken when discussing intermediation in markets. By taking a
broader stance, configurational analysis also allows to more accurately account for a
multitude of intermediation contexts and their dynamics, a better recognition of
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changing boundary conditions and the integration of multiple theoretical views
(Lyytinen & Damsgaard, 2011). Furthermore it reveals the complexity from the
perspective of different customer segments and enables a more thorough analysis of
coordination costs customers are faced with. The same segment of customers might use
different intermediation services in different situations.

5 Conclusion
The goal of this work was to recapitulate the paper of Sarkar et al. (1995) and to reflect
its key assumptions using evidence from the tourism market. By taking more factors
into account, we increase the complexity compared to the original model, which enables
the identification of important issues that should not be neglected when discussing the
phenomenon of intermediation in markets. Based on these issues, chapter 4 gave some
suggestions for future research.
With respect to the model of Sarkar et al. (1995), it can be stated that no clear answer
can be given to the question to what degree the amount of intermediation changes in a
market (in terms of more or less intermediaries) as a result of the introduction of ICT as
an exogenuous force. What we see is that different distribution channels co-exist and
that intermediaries are part of the multi-channel distribution strategy of tourism
suppliers, next to direct selling strategies.
The evolution of intermediation in markets is also highly contingent on industry
characteristics. Product and service characteristics influence the opportunities for
cybermediaries and the evolution of the industry structure (Klein & Teubner, 2000).
Tickets or bookings are non-transferable contracts that are not even written out on paper
anymore (e-ticket). The fixed costs are often very high due to high investments in e.g.
airplanes and hotel facilities. There are plenty of possibilities for product bundling and
differential pricing, the product complexity can be high and the price sensitivity of
customers varies (independent traveller vs. luxury-seeking tourist). This is a playground
for intermediaries and offers plenty of opportunities for IT-based business models that
support consumers in evaluating the different options and helps suppliers to find new
sales channels for their products.
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